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OVERVIEW OF THE TAUM SAUK PUMPED STORAGE POWER
PLANT UPPER RESERVOIR FAILURE, REYNOLDS COUNTY, MO
J. David Rogers
Missouri University of Science & Technology
Rolla, MO 65409-USA

Conor M. Watkins
Missouri University of Science & Technology
Rolla, MO 65409-USA

ABSTRACT
The Taum Sauk Pumped Storage Powerplant was constructed between 1960-63 to store water for generation during peak daytime
power demands. The plant consists of a lower reservoir, which is sited along the East Fork of the Black River, and an upper reservoir,
formed by a kidney-shaped rockfill dike approximately 70 to 90 ft high, capped by a 10 ft concrete parapet wall. The upper reservoir
held 1.5 billion gallons (~4,600 acre-feet) when filled.
A variety of design/construction flaws, instrumentation error, and human errors contributed to a catastrophic failure of the upper
reservoir on Dec 14, 2005. Malfunctioning and improperly programmed/placed sensors failed to indicate that the reservoir was full
and didn’t shut down the facility’s pumps until water had been overflowing for 5-6 minutes. This overflow undermined the parapet
wall and scoured the underlying embankment, leading to a complete failure within ~5-6 minutes. The peak flow from this event is
estimated at 289,000 cfs.

INTRODUCTION

GEOLOGIC SETTING

In 1953 Union Electric began considering construction of a
pumped storage facility to generate electrical power during
peak usage periods, which was a relatively new concept at that
time. The pumped storage scheme had the advantage of being
able to operate at full power almost immediately, allowing the
owner to postpone construction of a much larger steam plant
by harnessing some of the company’s off peak power.
Construction of the lower and upper storage reservoirs was
authorized for the Taum Sauk site in December 1959
(Gamble, 1960), and operations began in 1963.

The St. Francois Mountain region is a geologically unique
area forming Missouri’s oldest geologic province. During the
Precambrian time (>1,500 Ma) igneous granite rock formed
due to volcanic eruptions and intrusions of magma (Unklesbay
and Vineyard, 1992). Volcanoes erupted large quantities of
ashy pyroclastic flows and rhyolitic lava. Thick layers of
pyroclastic materials were deposited throughout the region as
either air fall tuff or ash flow tuff. Residual heat from the
eruptions often melted or “welded” the pyroclastic ash
fragments together and cooled to form a steel-hard igneous
rock known as welded tuff or ignimbrite. Most of the ash flow
tuff present in the Proffit Mountain region is reddish in color
and of felsic, or rhyolitic composition. Various rhyolites and
tuffs have a cumulative thickness of several thousand feet in
the St. Francois Mountains. Large bodies of reddish to
grayish granite formed when magma cooled slowly within
upper portions of the earth’s crust.

Although other sites were considered, the St. Francois
Mountains of southeast Missouri was selected. The rugged
topographic relief provided the required head for the efficient
operation of a pumped storage power plant and favorable
geology was conducive to the construction of the needed
reservoirs. The final selection of a location for the facility,
named the Taum Sauk Pumped Storage Hydroelectric Power
Plant, was chosen along the East Fork of the Black River and
atop Proffit Mountain near Annapolis, MO in Reynolds
County about 5 miles from Taum Sauk Mountain, the highest
point in the state. Proffit Mountain is the 6th highest point in
Missouri and provides around 800 feet of elevation differential
between its peak and the valley of the East Fork of the Black
River below.
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After the decrease and eventual halt of volcanic activity during
the Precambrian time, the area was subjected to the uplift of
the Ozark dome (Unklesbay and Vineyard, 1992). This uplift
exposed the igneous knobs and ridges common to the St.
Francois Mountains of today. When the Cambrian seas began
to rise, much the region was blanketed by water, leaving the
igneous knobs and ridges as highpoints or islands. Deposition
of sedimentary rocks during this time left thick layers of
sandstones and dolomites on the sea floor and draped layers of
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the same material on the slopes of the igneous highpoints and
knobs.
Regression of the Cambrian seas exposed the younger
sedimentary deposits and the igneous highpoints. Erosion of
the Cambrian strata cut new drainage patterns. In some
places, these drainage patterns were cut through sedimentary
deposits down to steep igneous ridges preserved in the
subsurface. The modern drainage pattern formed without
regard to the underlying Precambrian terrain, which resists the
effects of weathering and erosion to a greater degree than the
younger, softer sedimentary rocks. When rivers cut down into
these ancient bedrock ridges, their flow is locally restricted,
forming steep, closed in chutes and potholes called shut-ins.
Johnson Shut-Ins on the East Fork of the Black River is an
example of this type of feature and is located below the Upper
Taum Sauk Reservoir. As with the most of the Ozark Plateau,
the St. Francois Mountains were not glaciated during the
Pleistocene. This preserved many ancient, deeply weathered
zones of bedrock and soil which are present throughout the
region.
The Taum Sauk Upper Reservoir is located on Proffit
Mountain, a highpoint that remained exposed during the rise
of the Cambrian seas. The top of the mountain is comprised
mainly of what is known as Taum Sauk Rhyolite. During
construction of the Upper Reservoir, much of the mountain
top was blasted off, with the material, mainly broken Taum
Sauk Rhyolite, being used to construct the Upper Reservoir’s
rock-fill dike:
The Taum Sauk Rhyolite is a red to dark
maroon ash flow tuff containing up to 30
percent phenocrysts of alkali feldspar and
quartz; fiamme may or may not be present.
The formation is widely exposed in the
Proffit-Wildcat-Taum Sauk mountain area.
Although its maximum thickness has not
been established, it is greater than 3000 feet
thick. The type section is in sec 15, T.33 N.,
R. 2 E.; Johnson Shut-Ins Quadrangle
(Thompson, 1995).

CONSTRUCTION AND EARLY HISTORY
The Taum Sauk Pumped Storage Hydroelectric Power Plant
was constructed from 1960-1962 and began operation in 1963.
The lower reservoir was formed by constructing a ~60 foot
high concrete gravity dam along the East Fork of the Black
River ~3 miles upstream of Lesterville, MO. The upper
reservoir was sited on Proffit Mountain, approximately ~800
feet above the lower reservoir and connected by a 7,000 foot
long tunnel. The upper reservoir was created by excavating
the crest of Proffit Mountain and using the muck to construct a
kidney-shaped rockfill dike with a maximum height of ~90
feet. An as-built cross section is shown in Fig. 1. The water
side of the embankment was lined with shotcrete and capped
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by a 10 foot high parapet wall. The total capacity of the upper
reservoir was about 4,600 acre-feet.

Fig. 1. – North side of the breached embankment shows the
lower three quarters was end-dumped while the upper quarter
was placed into two sequences of rolled filling. There does
not appear to have been any significant effort made to
mechanically compact the embankment because it was
assumed to be a clean rockfill.
The majority of the upper reservoir’s rockfill embankment
appears to have been constructed through simple end dumping
of the excavated material. The fill was allowed to tumble
down the side of the embankment, lying near its natural angle
of repose. The embankment materials were not mechanically
compacted until the upper 16 feet of fill, which was
compacted in four separate 4-foot thick lifts. According to
FERC (2006), this was the last uncompacted concrete faced
rockfill dam constructed in the United States. The boundaries
between the different methods of fill placement were easily
observed in the breached section of the embankment after the
failure (see Fig. 2).

Fig. 2. – North side of the breached embankment shows the
lower three quarters was end-dumped while the upper quarter
was placed into two sequences of rolled filling. There does
not appear to have been any significant effort made to
mechanically compact the embankment because it was
assumed to be a clean rockfill.
A 350 MW powerhouse/pumping station was located at the
southern base of Proffitt Mountain, accessed by a channel,
excavated into the native bedrock. This station was equipped
with two reversible pump/turbine units of which one or both
would operate in pumping or generation, depending on the
power demand and available water in the reservoir. In 1999
the two units were upgraded to 440 MW capacity, which could
lift up to 5,238 cfs into the upper reservoir under full head.
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SETTLEMENT OF THE UPPER RESERVOIR
EMBANKMENT
High rates of settlement were experienced at the upper
reservoir during the first four and a half years of operation.
Between 0.5 and 0.8 feet of settlement were experienced
during this time, which correlates to 0.53% to 0.73% of the
total embankment height, respectively. J. Barry Cooke (19152005), a member of the National Academy of Engineering,
served as a consultant to Union Electric for the project, from
the time of its design and many years thereafter. In 1967
Cooke summarized his observations about the reservoir’s
performance in a letter to Union Electric (Cooke, 1967).
Cooke felt that the average settlement rate of over 0.1 ft/year
was unprecedented, compared to other rockfill dams, but was
acceptable. He concluded that “The Taum Sauk Rhyolite
Porphyry is an excellent high compressive strength rock that
should have stabilized in its settlement. However, the
formation contained frequent zones of soft weathered rock, all
of which could not have been selectively wasted” and that “I
believe that a fill of 100% competent rock would have
stabilized and that the percentage of weathered rock in the
Taum Sauk is the cause.” An example of such a weathered
zone is shown in Fig. 20.
Settlement continued up to the time of failure in December
2005, with differential settlements approaching two feet along
the crest of the reservoir’s parapet wall (see Fig 3). This
differential settlement also led to a cracking of the concrete
lining and continual problems with leakage. Leakage became
so severe in 1963, only months after operations began, it
necessitated shutdown of the facility and additional grouting
of the reservoir floor in the northwest portion near where the
reservoir failed in 2005 (FERC Independent Panel, 2006).

Geosynthetics Inc. (GSI) was contracted to line the upper
reservoir in 2004 at a cost of ~$2.4 million in an attempt to
reduce this leakage. GSI supervised the placement of 1.3
million square feet of 80 mil high density polyethylene
(HPDE) textured geomembrane and geocomposite material.
They also covered five rock outcroppings on the inboard side
slopes with 80 mil textured linear low density polyethylene
(LLDPE) material. After the lining project was completed,
leakage from the reservoir was reduced dramatically (see Fig.
4). Leakage rates dropped by an order of magnitude, from an
average of around 50 cfs to about 5 cfs and the overall
efficiency of the facility reached ~70% (FERC, 2004; and
FERC, 2005).

Fig. 4. – This figure from FERC’s Independent Panel of
Consultants Report (2006) shows a gradual upward trend in
leakage rates until it was lined in 2004, dramatically reducing
seepage.

DEREGULATION LED TO INCREASED UTILIZATION

Fig. 3. – This figure illustrates the differential settlement
along the crest of the upper reservoir parapet wall. Four
segments of the parapet wall were almost two feet lower than
their original elevation. The elevations of the breached panels
(shown here in red) were estimated by AmerenUE after the
failure and may not be accurate. (Data: MoDNR (2006))

The Taum Sauk facility was operated approximately 100 days
a year prior to deregulation of electric power markets in the
1990’s. Deregulation allowed utilities to sell power on the
open or spot market at non-regulated rates to other utilities,
increasing the value of power sold during periods of peak
demand. This change in the markets made it profitable to run
the facility around 300 days a year and AmeronUE provided
financial incentives for executives based on the profitability of
their power generation facilities (Leonard, 2006 and Leonard,
2007). Increased utilization likely influenced the decision to
upgrade the pump/turbine units in 1999, which increased the
efficiency and profitability of the plant.

INSTALLATION OF GEOMEMBRANE LINING
Leakage continued to increase each year, leading to concerns
about the stability of the dike section and the efficiency of
pumped storage operations. The upper reservoir was losing
about two feet, or about 110 acre feet or water, to seepage
each day (Tomich and Leiser, 2006). Some of this water was
collected in small ponds and pumped back into the upper
reservoir to retain efficiency.
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RECOGNITION COINCIDENT WITH SERIOUS
INSTRUMENTATION PROBLEMS
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
declared the Taum Sauk Plant an Engineering Milestone on
Sept. 26, 2005. This recognition has only been bestowed on
~75 engineering project worldwide. The Taum Sauk project
was recognized for:
3

•

•
•

•

The plant was the largest in North America and one
of the first of its type when it was constructed in
1963.
The plant used the largest turbine generators/pumps
in the nation when placed in operation.
It was the first hydroelectric plant to be operated
remotely (from St. Louis or the Bagnell Dam Power
Plant), without humans onsite.
Its ability to re-start the power grid in the event of a
complete blackout, as coal and nuclear plants need
external power to re-start.

Some AmeronUE employees visited the upper reservoir on
Sunday September 25th, the day before the IEEE awards
ceremony. They observed water pouring over the parapet wall
along the northwest portion of the reservoir, in an incident
they described as resembling “Niagara Falls.” Operators acted
quickly to manually shut down the pumps and turn on the
generating units to lower the reservoir. Normally, workers
wouldn’t have been onsite on a Sunday morning.
Inspections after the September 25th overtopping revealed
scour of the rockfill embankment up to 1 foot deep. Windwhipped waves from the remnants of Hurricane Rita were
initially assumed to have played a role in fomenting the
overtopping, but the reservoir level was well above the normal
freeboard maintained below the crest of the parapet wall.
Media reports suggest that a second, minor overtopping
occurred on September. 27th, one day after the plant won the
award and two days after the initial incident. On this occasion
water levels were observed 4” from the top of the parapet wall
and moisture on the land side of the parapet wall panels
indicated minor overtopping had occurred that morning,
however, it was not observed.
According to news paper accounts (Tomich, and Hand, 2006),
AmeronUE’s plant operator sent an e-mail to his supervisors
on September 27th warning them about continued overtopping
of the upper reservoir after the second overtopping incident.
The operator stated that “Overflowing the upper reservoir is
obviously an absolute 'NO-NO,'" "The dam would severely
erode and cause eventual failure of the dam…“ and “If water
continued to spill over the top of the wall, it could cause a
section to collapse and then it would be all down hill from
there — literally.”

drawn down. This shows the sensor conduits have detached
from their anchorages.

Deflected conduits

2 Tensioned Cables to
which conduits were
originally fastened

Failed unistrut
assembly

Fig. 5. – This photo taken on October 5, 2006 by AmerenUE
shows the gross deflection of the reservoir’s instrumentation
array (photo from Rizzo Associates, 2006).
It was assumed that the two foot adjustment would prevent the
reservoir pool from overflowing until repairs could be
completed 6 to 8 months hence. The reservoir was also
equipped with “fail safe” Warrick probes, which were
intended to shut down the pumps automatically if the water
level reached a pre-programmed elevation on the parapet wall.
These probes used conductivity readings, which only activate
when exposed to water in the reservoir. These probes were
intended to be a “fail-safe backup” in case the stage sensors in
the submerged conduits failed for some reason. If the Warrick
probes activated, the pumping units were programmed to shut
down immediately instead of the normal method of gradually
ramping down the inflow.

THE FAILURE
The 6,562 ft long parapet wall was comprised of 111 panels,
each about 60 feet long. Each wall panel was designated by a
number, between 1 and 111. These numbers are referred to in
the description that follow. See Fig. 6 for locations of
overflow (shown in brown) and the eventual breach (shown in
red).

Divers were summoned and they ascertained that the new
sensor conduits had become detached from their mountings
along the sloping concrete face of the reservoir. Maximum
water levels in the reservoir were re-programmed to reduce the
operating level by two feet to provide a temporary “margin of
error.”
Unfortunately, permanent repairs were postponed
until regularly-maintenance the following spring (FERC Taum
Sauk Investigation Team, 2006) to avoid an additional
shutdown of the facility. Fig. 5 shows a Photo taken by
AmerenUE on Oct 5th, 2005 when the reservoir pool was
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transported downslope and deposited in fans towards the toe
of the embankment. The plunge pool deepened itself within a
matter of minutes, displacing the largest clasts onto the rim of
the plunge pool. Plunge pools normally excavate themselves
to a depth of 1.5 times the free fall height on level ground, but
the steep face of the rockfill dike (1.3:1, horizontal to vertical)
may have exacerbated this situation, allowing an even deeper
pool to develop. This statement is based on post-failure
observations below Panels 71-72 (shown in Figure 7). The
overtopping flow appears to have undermined three adjacent
panels of the parapet wall in about six minutes, centered
around panel 95, on the northwest side of the reservoir.
Excerpts from a reconstructed failure sequence and
complementary photos illustrative the failure mode (see Figs.
8-18.).
Fig. 6. – This graphic from Rizzo Associates, Inc. (2006)
shows panel locations where overflow and failure occurred.
On Wednesday December 14th, 2005, the main reservoir stage
sensors failed to shut down the pumps feeding water into the
upper reservoir during the closing stages of its nightly filling.
The “fail safe” Warrick probes affixed to the parapet wall
were not activated. Water began pouring over the reservoir’s
parapet wall at the four locations where the wall had
experienced the greatest settlement (shown in Fig. 6). Data
recovered from the reservoir’s control system and backcalculations indicate that the overflow likely initiated around
5:09 AM along the northwest portion of the reservoir (in the
vicinity of wall panel 95). The parapet wall failed between
panels 88 and 97, though physical evidence of overtopping
was also observed beneath panels 100-103. One of the turbine
pump units had shut down prior to overtopping (this unit was
programmed to shut down 4-6 feet below the wall crest), but
the second unit continued to run until the depth of overflow at
panel 95 location was over ~4.3 inches. This pumping unit
was programmed to shut down when the reservoir level rose to
within 2 feet of the wall crest. Water levels continued to rise
until the second unit shut down. Based on back-calculations
from a series of reports including Rizzo Associates, Inc.
(2006), FERC’s Independent Panel (2006), and FERC’s Taum
Sauk Investigation Team (2006), the reservoir was likely
within seconds of failure by the time the second pump unit
shut down.
The overflow resembled flow over a broad crested weir, with
an extremely broad ‘V-shape’ over a distance of almost 900
feet. This condition would have trained more discharge
towards the center of the settled section.
The discharge passing over the parapet wall initially spilled
onto the wall’s outboard footing, which was three feet wide.
When the depth of overtopping exceeded 4.1 inches the lower
nappe of the spillage would have begun spilling onto the
unprotected embankment materials, scouring the rockfill
beneath the wall. Post-failure observations at Panels 10-12,
43-56, and 69-74, (which all survived) suggest that the water
quickly scoured deep plunge pools where it poured directly
onto the unprotected rockfill. These materials were rapidly
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Fig. 7. – This photo taken below panels 71-72 show the deep
plunge pool that developed and subsequent undercutting of
the parapet wall. (Photo courtesy of David Hoffman).

Fig 8. – The first figure from the reconstructed failure
sequence shows the initiation of overtopping around 6 minutes
prior to failure. Water is spilling onto the 3 foot wide parapet
wall footing and just beginning to erode crest of the
embankment.

5

Photo by David Hoffman

Fig 9. – This photograph shows arrows representing the
overflow nappe once it extended beyond the 3 foot wide wall
footing and directly onto the underlying rockfill. The rate of
scour and erosion increased dramatically once this occurred.
At 5:15 AM, only six minutes after overtopping is believed to
have initiated, the 60-foot long segment near wall panel 95
toppled, unleashing 15 feet of flowing water over the
remaining embankment and concrete liner (Figure 7).

Fig. 11. – This step portrays how the parapet wall toppled in
vicinity of panel 95, initiating the catastrophic failure of the
reservoir by unleashing ~15 feet of flow over the remaining
embankment.

Fig. 12. – This figure illustrates ~15 feet of water overflowing
the embankment immediately after the failure of the parapet.
The reinforced concrete liner behaved as a thin-crested weir
and allowed for the formation of a deep plunge pool.

Fig 10. – This step of the reconstructed failure sequence
illustrates the undermining of the parapet wall and rapid
erosion of the embakment. The wall remained standing at this
point due to the hydrostatic load on the inclined portion of the
wall footing and 3-dimensional effects from surrounding wall
panels.
Fig. 13. – The embankment and concrete liner are
progressively removed by the outflow. About one half the
embankment remains at this stage.
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Fig. 14. – A continuation of the sequence show deepening of
the plunge pool and ejection of large shingle blocks/boulders.
Fig. 18. – The remnant lip as seen at the failure site.

Fig. 15. – The plunge pool deepens towards the foundation
interface and outflow has exposed much of the underlying
bedrock, which is then scoured.

The water surged down the upper slopes of Proffit Mountain,
stripping the land of vegetation and soil into the underlying
bedrock, and exposing the unique geology of the reservoir’s
foundation. The flow was highly turbid and included rockfill,
concrete, rebar, and the geosynthetic liner along with soil/rock
and hundreds of trees. The flow banked around curves with
depths of up to 100 feet before entering the floodplain of the
East Fork of the Black River, at Johnson’s Shut-ins State Park.
The park was heavily damaged and filled with debris. The
flood waters passed through the narrow bedrock chute frmed
by the Shut-ins and continued downstream to AmerenUE’s
lower reservoir, where most of the discharge and debris were
captured. Damage downstream was limited to increased
turbidity of the Black River from silt and other fines which
were carried over the Lower Taum Sauk Dam.

KEY FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE
“Dirty” Rockfill Embankment
Fig. 16. – The embankment undergoes one final large collapse
involving the concrete liner, sending one final surge down the
slope.

Fig. 17. – A small lip formed by the concrete liner armored
the final last remnants of the embankment. Only a small
amount of water remained in the reservoir.
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After the reservoir failure, The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) and the Missouri Department of Natural
Resources, Dam and Reservoir Safety Division (MoDNRGSRAD) conducted investigations into the failure. Although
the embankment was intended to be clean rockfill (less than
5% passing the No. 200 sieve) an excessive amount of finegrained material was visually recognized in the exposed dike
one day after the failure (Leonard, 2005). Forensic analyses
by FERC’s Taum Sauk Investigation Team (2006), FERC’s
Independent Panel (2006), and by Rizzo Associates, Inc.
(2006) confirmed a fines content of between zero and 20% in
the exposed embankment bordering the breach (shown in Figs.
2 and 19). In addition, the percentage of sand sized material
within the embankment was as great as 45% in certain
locations, creating a far more erodable mixture than normally
expected of clean rockfill (FERC Independent Panel, 2006).
This problem was manifest by the unusual level of surfical
erosion during the project’s 42 year life, from rainfall-induced
runoff (FERC Independent Panel, 2006). Cooke (1967)
surmised that the dike could not have been clean rockfill
because the observed settlement was almost an order of
magnitude greater than those recorded on other concrete-faced
rockfill dams (prior to 1967).
7

Insufficient Foundation Preparation
The project’s design specifications called for the
embankment’s foundation to be stripped clean of all residuum
and native soils before placement of the dumped rockfill.
Remaining soils were to have been less than two inches thick
and near saturation prior to fill placement.

Fig. 19. - Close up of “dirty” rockfill exposed on lateral
margins of the breach. The large clasts are 10-12 inches
diameter.

Post-failure investigations included exploratory drilling
through the embankment-foundation interface to ascertain the
character of the contact. These borings revealed that up to 18
inches of residual soil were not stripped off prior to placement
of the rock fill. Soils containing tree roots and other organic
matter were also observed beneath the breached section of the
embankment (see Fig. 21). This may have contributed to the
increased settlement and shifting of the embankment in this
area, due to the high fines content, poor drainage, and higher
compressibility of the un-stripped residual soil cap, as well as
the ‘dirty’ rockfill.

Weathered Material in Embankment
The December 2005 outbreak flood exposed deeply weathered
zones in the bedrock slopes of Proffit Mountain. A seam of
weathered rhyolite was observed beneath the breached section
of the embankment. The upper slopes of Proffit Mountain
also contains a zone of deeply weathered diabase saprolite,
which appears to be the remnant of a disintegrated dike or sill
(see Fig. 20). Adjacent granites and rhyolites also exhibited a
high degree of weathering, likely from hydrothermal alteration
associated with intrusion of the diabase. The weathered
diabase exhibits a soil-like texture, though retaining the rock’s
original fabric and fracture patterns. Core stones and remnant
spheroidal weathering rinds are also visible.

Fig. 20. – A zone of deeply weathered bedrock (saprolite) on
the upper slopes of Proffit Mountain appears to have formed
due to the disintegration of a diabase dike or sill and nearby
hydrothermally altered granites.
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Fig. 21. – Residual soils, including tree roots and other
organic matter, were observed left in place beneath the failed
portion of the upper reservoir embankment.
Weathered rhyolite was also discovered beneath the breached
section.
This area had been over-excavated during
construction, due to a “highly weathered zone” noticed at the
time (FERC Taum Sauk Investigation Team, 2006). This
northwest corner was the lowest area of the upper reservoir
floor, except for a small area around the circular inlet used to
fill and drain the pool. Additional filling was also required for
this portion of the dike because of a natural depression in the
flank of Proffit Mountain. These factors necessitated that the
dike reach its maximum volumetric cross section in the
northwest corner of the upper reservoir. This coincided with
the area that also experienced some of the greatest settlement,
over a zone about 900 feet long. The only location with
greater settlement was at the juncture between panels 71-72,
but this was a very narrow zone. The high percentage of fines
in this portion of the dike would have exacerbated drainage
and promoted settlement, due to hydrocompression (Rogers,
1998).
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Issues Related to Liner Installation and Re-attachment of
Instrumentation in 2004
The upper reservoir’s monitoring system was anchored
directly to the concrete lining prior to the fall of 2004, when it
was replaced during installation of the HDPE geomembrane
liner. The sensor network was comprised of four perforated
HDPE conduits. The original design assumed two of the
conduits would house pressure transducers; with another
conduit serving as an extra; and a fourth conduit to be filled
with concrete, to serve as ballast for all four, since they would
be subjected to almost daily reservoir cycling. The original
design specified that the instrument conduit array would be
anchored to the new HDPE liner using welded HDPE straps.
The contractor pointed out that this design could reduce the
expected life of the liner by creating stress concentrations
around the attachment points, and they suggested that the
conduits should be attached to the concrete face beneath the
liner (Rizzo Associates, Inc., 2006).
The alternative scheme used a pair of untensioned steel cables
passing through eye bolts anchored to the concrete lining,
above and below the HPDE lining. For unknown reasons, it
was also decided to dispense with the concrete-filled ballast
conduit, so this pipe was installed as another spare, and the
entire array was bereft of any meaningful ballast.
The eye bolt scheme was then discarded in favor of
turnbuckles, so the anchor cables could be tensioned and
adjusted, after the array was in place and subjected to cyclic
loading by the reservoir pool. Unfortunately, the turnbuckles
were not locked after being tensioned, and they appear to have
loosened themselves during cyclic loading engendered by the
filling and emptying to the reservoir each day. The four
sensor conduits were attached every 20 feet with hardware
assemblies known as unistruts. A unistrut is a series of
galvanized U-bolts fastened to a flat galvanized steel bracket.
There were four U-bolts over the conduits at each unistrut
anchor point. The cyclic uplift loads caused by near-daily
reservoir filling and draining gradually loosened the
instrumentation conduit array and the conduits worked
themselves free of their unistrut anchors. The omission of
ballast allowed much higher uplift forces to be realized by the
sensor conduits, as air and water was trapped inside of them.
The two anchor cables were unable to keep the array aligned
because their turnbuckle anchors loosened.
As the turnbuckles failed, the unistruts were subjected to
additional cyclic stresses and began coming apart. Once the
four conduits were no longer attached to each other, they
began to deform individually, instead of collectively. Since
the individual stiffness of the conduits was less than their
cumulative stiffness, the failure of the unitstrut assemblies
played an important role leading to the eventual failure of the
instrumentation system.
The base of the instrumentation array was also located
approximately 120 feet from the 35 foot diameter glory hole
inlet, which pumped water into the reservoir at a rate of 5,238
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cfs. Vortices associated with this concentration of flow in and
out of the inlet may have induced local currents and
engendered traction forces on the lower unistrut anchors, in
addition to the reservoir cycling. It is believed that sensor
readings were erroneously low, between slightly more than 3
ft and as much as 4.2 ft, due to these problems (FERC
Independent Panel, 2006).

Elevation Datum/Staff Gage discrepancies introduced during
liner installation
The upper reservoir was designed to have two feet of
freeboard between the water surface and the top of the parapet
wall. A staff gauge installed on the inside of the concrete
parapet wall at Panel 58 and sloping interior reservoir face
during construction had settled approximately one foot over
42 years. The old gauging system was operated relative to this
staff gage at Panel 58, so freeboard at the staff gage remained
constant throughout the years, even as the gage settled.
Unfortunately, differential settlement elsewhere around the
reservoir was greater. The new gauging system was operated
in terms of absolute elevation, which was one foot higher than
the elevations stated on the staff gage. This resulted in a one
foot reduction of absolute freeboard, and, thereby, lowered the
margin of error against overtopping.

Error in Location and Programming of “Fail Safe” Probes
The upper reservoir’s “fail-safe” Warrick probes, which were
intended to shut down inflow whenever the reservoir rose to
within 2 feet of crest failed to activate after the overtopping
initiated, and were unable to save the structure. These probes
were located on the parapet wall at Panel 58, ABOVE the
lowest points along the parapet wall at four other locations
around the reservoir. FERC’s Taum Sauk Investigation Team
(2006) states that the two Warrick probes were at elevations
1597.4 ft (Hi probe) and 1597.67 ft (Hi-Hi probe),
respectively. The lowest point along reservoir’s parapet wall
was at panel 72, with a crest elevation of 1597.0 ft., below
both Warrick probes (FERC Independent Panel, 2006).
Although panel 95 was destroyed in the failure, its crest had
an estimated height 1597.25 ft. (Rizzo Associates, Inc., 2006),
also below the Warrick probes. The auto-stop probes failed to
activate during the two overtopping incidents in late
September and this fact appears to have been overlooked prior
to the Dec 14th failure. The Warrick probes were kept as high
as possible to prevent false alarms and shut downs, due to
wind-whipped waves, but were mistakenly placed well above
the lowest points on the parapet wall. These could easily have
been moved to lower elevations on the parapet wall at panel
#58.
The probes were also programmed with a one minute delay
before alarms would sound and the pumps would shut down
(FERC Independent Panel, 2006 and FERC Taum Sauk
Investigation Team, 2006). This delay would have allowed
between 0.75 and 1.5 inches of additional water to be pumped
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into the reservoir, depending if one or both pumping units
were running at the time. (FERC Taum Sauk Investigation
Team, 2006).
The Warrick probes were also programmed to operate in series
instead of in parallel, which only triggered the auto-stop
system to activate if both probes had been activated for the
programmed time (60 seconds). Although the Hi limit probe
was located 4.92 inches above the lowest point along the crest
of the parapet wall, it could have kept an additional 3.6 inches
of water from flowing over the wall, provided that the probes
had been programmed in parallel and with a 10 second delay
(FERC Taum Sauk Investigation Team, 2006).
Although it did not play a role in the failure, an additional
programming error was uncovered during the post-failure
investigations.
The Programmable Logic Controller at
pumping unit 2 had been mistakenly programmed so that it
couldn’t read input from either of the Warrick probes (FERC
Taum Sauk Investigation Team, 2006). Pumping unit 2 had
already shut down normally prior to water levels reaching the
Hi limit probe, but unit 1 continued to pump, resulting in the
failure. Had the Warrick probes been positioned below the
lowest point(s) along the crest of the parapet wall and
programmed with a proper delay, this error could have
resulted in an identical failure had pumping unit 2 been set to
shut down last.

there hadn’t been any safety incidents of note until the Niagara
Falls incidents in September 2005). The absence of visual
inspections meant that the deterioration of freeboard (due to
progressive creep displacement of the instrumentation
conduits) was not noticed until the first overtopping incident
on September 25, 2005. At this juncture the actual water levels
should have been “ground truthed,” or compared with the
levels being reported by the reservoir’s instrumentation
(FERC Independent Panel, 2006). Instead, it was assumed
that increasing the freeboard by three feet would provide an
adequate margin of error to account for the instrumentation
problems.
A retrospective review of the reservoir stage records suggests
that something was awry with the instrumentation because it
repeatedly shows water levels that do not make sense, based
on the conditions prior to the failure. Some examples include:
1) the water level within the reservoir not rising when both
pumping units were on; 2) the level rising 1 foot in 20 minutes
with both pumping units on (it should have reported a 2.5 foot
rise), and, 3) a 1.9 foot decrease in the reservoir level with
both pumps operating. The system was not programmed to
report or flag abnormal inflow rates to alert plant operators
although it was recorded in the facility’s computers (FERC
Taum Sauk Investigation Team, 2006).

IMPACTS OF THE FAILURE
Water may have reached as high as 1597.7 feet due to the
combination of the excessively high probe elevation, the
programming of the probes to operate in series, and the
programmed one minute delay in their activation (FERC
Taum Sauk Investigation Team, 2006).

Administrative Procedures
AmerenUE had no formalized oversight to oversee
modifications to the reservoir’s instrumentation and
documentation on such changes was lacking to non-existent.
There was also no formalized procedure to test such changes
to insure they were properly implemented. Nor was there any
documentation rationalizing the decision to program the
probes in parallel or with a 60 second delay (FERC Taum
Sauk Investigation Team, 2006).
The reservoir was routinely filled to within 1 foot of the
parapet wall crest, providing an exceeding low margin of
error, as compared to other pumped storage facilities in the
United States (which usually operate with freeboards between
3 and 5 feet). This low margin of error was exacerbated by
differential settlement of the parapet wall, which allowed four
other zones to be about a foot lower than assumed by the plant
operators (FERC Independent Panel, 2006). Visual oversight
of the pumped storage operations were recommended by
Cooke (1967) and initially implemented by Union Electric
soon thereafter (Weldy, 1968). Sometime between 1968 and
the failure in 2005, visual oversight was discarded as being an
unnecessary precaution by the operators (probably, because
Paper No. 2.43

During the spring 2006 and 2007 legislative sessions the
Missouri governor and state legislature considered revising
their dam safety act (initially adopted in 1977, but not funded
until 1981) to improve inspection and maintenance of dams
deemed to be a danger if they were to fail (e.g. lying above
populated areas). Some legislators from rural counties and
agricultural areas worried about increased costs associated
with regulations so they voted against the bill, defeating the
measure.
AmerenUE examined its internal policies and pledged to make
changes in its operating and maintenance procedures to
prevent future problems. A full-time dam safety officer has
been hired to oversee all hydropower-related projects within
the company. This official has been given the authority to
shut down any hydropower facility due to safety concerns.
His authority supersedes other decision makers in the
company’s chain of command.
AmerenUE is paying for 100% of the clean-up and repair at
Johnson’s Shut-ins State Park.
FERC has approved
AmerenUE’s plan to rebuild the upper reservoir and the utility
has expressed a desire to resume operations at the facility,
which still holds a valid FERC permit. The utility is involved
in a lawsuit and investigation by the Missouri Attorney
General’s office. In November 2007 another suit was filed
against AmeronUE by the Great Rivers Environmental Law
Center alleging that FERC has failed to properly monitor the
reconstruction project. Both of these suits have slowed the
approval process. AmeronUE hopes to reconstruct the upper
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reservoir using a roller compacted concrete (RCC)
embankment with a spillway discharging over the eastern side
of Proffit Mountain, onto uninhabited lands that the utility
owns and controls, in a direction away from Johnson’s Shut-in
State Park. Additional measures will also be undertaken to
reduce the risk of overtopping.

RECORD FINE BY FERC
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission fined AmerenUE
$15 million; the largest fine ever accessed by the agency and
is 30 times larger than the previous record fine of $500,000.
FERC assessed its record fine based on the following aspects
(FERC, 2006):
• Failure to report the Sept. 25, 2005 overtopping to
FERC
• Failure to report unusual instrument readings on Sept.
27th
• Failure to report the release of the transducer
retention system
• Addition of 0.4 feet to the water level in the
programmable logic controller to compensate for
inaccurate readings
• Failure to repair the loose transducers
• Operation of the reservoir with insufficient freeboard
• Fail-safe probes moved to an elevation higher than
the lowest point on the reservoir parapet wall
• System programmed to have a 1 minute delay in
pump shutdown after activation of probes
• Probes reprogrammed to operate in series instead of
in parallel
• Lowest of two probes not programmed to sound
alarm when activated
All of the listed modifications to the facility required
AmerenUE to notify FERC prior to such changes being
implemented.

DISASTER COULD HAVE BEEN MUCH WORSE
The results from this failure could have been far worse had it
occurred at a different time of year. Hundreds of unsuspecting
campers would easily have perished in the state park
campground had the failure occurred just six months later, on
a busy summer weekend. The timing of the overtopping
failure towards the end of its nightly filling cycle (around 5:15
AM) would have caught campers in their tents and
recreational vehicles, and seasonal park staff in their nearby
cabins. Fortunately, the campground was empty during the
middle of December, resulting in no deaths and just five
injuries.
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PRIMARY FACTORS CAUSING THE FAILURE AND
LESSONS LEARNED
Although multiple factors contributed to the disaster, these
might never have culminated in a catastrophic failure had a
conventional spillway system been included in the original
design, or a subsequent retrofit. Everyone in the chain of
corporate decision making seemed to assume that the three
foot adhoc adjustment to the reservoir stage levels would
easily account for any deficiencies for another 6+ months of
operation, without quantifying the actual errors or verifying
the failure mechanisms causing the erroneous readings. The
two Niagara Falls incidents should have triggered more indepth investigations and assessments of the problem, not to
mention reports of the incidents and investigations to FERC.
Any engineered system is capable of malfunctioning for an
array of reasons, including aging and/or unforeseen
circumstances. Many of the facility’s shortcomings were
adroitly pointed out in the first FERC peer review in 1967
(Cooke, 1967).
The impact of the differential settlement of the dike should
have been appreciated by whoever was responsible for
reservoir stage instrumentation. The dike is only as “high” as
its lowest elevation; not the crest elevation where the
instruments are located. Aging impacts are some of the most
difficult to appreciate and/or anticipate, especially, if they
have never been encountered previously by the personnel
charged with making operational decisions.
The change orders allowing the instrument conduits to be
affixed to the unistrut anchors without any ballast would not
have faired well had they been subjected to external peer
review. This is because pumped storage projects are subject to
much more severe load cycling than conventional storage
facilities. Last minute connection details often prove to be
problematic. Hidden design and construction flaws can often
cause unforeseen difficulties with operation and maintenance
throughout the life of a reservoir.
The overflow incident on September 25th and 27th should have
triggered an active monitoring program at the very least, to
ascertain whether the problem was worsening with each cycle
of filling.
In conclusion, the principal contributing factors appear to have
been a series of errors in human judgment. It is estimated that
only six minutes of malfunction fomented the catastrophe.
Once the sensor problem was identified, a worker could have
been hired to observe the reservoir level during the few critical
minutes when the reservoir was topping off its nightly refill.
Critical engineering systems with the ability to endanger life,
property, and the environment should employ sufficient
redundancy to survive the failure or malfunction of any single
component, without suffering a catastrophic failure. The
Warrick gages affixed to the parapet wall were intended to
provide such a “fail safe” backup.
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As in the case of most systems failures, this project could have
benefited immeasurably from periodic external peer review by
a mixed panel comprised of people with substantive
experience with the operation of pumped storage projects;
with particular reference to the instrumentation scheme.
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